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Three Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Institutions

Three Essays on Corporate Finance and Financial Institutions
Author: Yan Wang
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

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"This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay provides a systematic way to distinguish informed institutional trades from uninformed ones based on the relation between institutional trades and sequential public information. By studying actively managed U.S. institutions from 1994 to 2010, I show that institutional trades initiated by managers responding proactively to upcoming informational signals strongly predict future stock returns. A hedging portfolio based on these trades generates an average risk-adjusted abnormal return of approximately 3% per quarter. The predictability is more pronounced for stocks with higher information asymmetry, such as those of firms with high volatility and young age. I also find that the most informed institutional traders are likely to have short-term investment horizon, large block holdings, high industry portfolio concentrations, as well as reside in financial centers. My results indicate that the informedness of certain institutional investor groups is substantially reduced after Regulation FD. The second essay examines the product market impact of minority stake acquisitions. We show that partial equity ownership between rival firms has a significant impact on industry competition. Industry-level tests indicate that acquisitions of a minority stake in competing firms' equity are followed by higher output prices and higher price-cost margins, particularly in industries with high barriers to entry. Stock-price reactions of non-participating competitors of the acquirer and target are positive while announcement returns of customer firms are negative. Moreover, the positive (negative) stock-price reaction of competitors (customers) is more pronounced when the acquirer and target are larger firms with greater market share. These results indicate that equity ownership of rival firms dampens competition in an industry.The third essay examines whether foreign firms by listing on or delisting from regular U.S. stock exchanges affect their U.S. counterparts. We find that they do - negatively for listings and positively for delistings, - and the impact is especially profound for the listing events. The U.S. counterparts of foreign firms belonging to the same industry experience severe underperformance in the short- and long-run across a variety of financial and accounting performance metrics, such as firm returns as well as growth in sales, profits, total assets, and capital expenditures. For example, the average 60-day cumulative abnormal return of U.S. firms around the foreign listing date is negative 2%, while the 36-month post-listing return is negative 4.3%. This result is present among listings with and without U.S. equity issuance. In addition, incumbent U.S. firms experience changes in their financing policies and a reduction in analyst coverage following listings of competing foreign firms in the U.S. Our findings therefore highlight an important role of international markets in influencing U.S. firms and markets. " --


Three Essays on Institutional Investors

Three Essays on Institutional Investors
Author: Ligang Zhong
Publisher:
Total Pages: 436
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

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In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of institutional investors on security prices and corporate policies, and offer a new perspective on the vital role that institutional investors play in the modern capital market. Specifically, on the impact on security price movements, I design a new measure of stock-level sentiment based on mutual fund publically disclosed portfolio information and provide a new dimension to better predict stock returns. A trading strategy based on the new sentiment metrics can generate an annualized alpha of 21.27%. The abnormal returns cannot be explained by the time-varying expected returns and transaction costs, and can be best explained by mutual fund overreactions. Hence, my findings can be interpreted as a new anomaly in a new era-when institutional investors are the marginal traders. On the impact on corporate policy side, I document two pieces of new empirical evidence on the importance of long-term institutional holdings: the entrenchment effect of long-term institutional holdings in the context of corporate financing decisions and the active monitoring role of long-term institutional investors in the context of international firms' accounting qualities. Combined with previous studies which favour a long-term institutional investor, the evidence on the cost side of long-term holding I document here can serve as the first call for an optimal investment horizon for firms operating in the U.S.


Three Essays in Political Economy and Corporate Finance

Three Essays in Political Economy and Corporate Finance
Author: Anqi Jiao
Publisher:
Total Pages: 145
Release: 2020
Genre: Electronic dissertations
ISBN:

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This dissertation consists of three essays exploring the issues related to the political economy of finance and corporate finance. The first essay studies whether and how institutional investors exert influence in firms' external governance environments related to law and politics. I explore the role of institutional investors in corporate lobbying of their portfolio firms. I find that greater lobbying institutional ownership leads to more lobbying activities of firms. This effect is more pronounce in the subsample where firms face constraints to lobbying. I identify two plausible channels through which institutional investors can facilitate corporate lobbying. First, institutional investors tend to provide direct support by lobbying in the same congressional bills with firms possessing greater weights in their portfolios. Second, institutional investors protect firms' political information by voting against shareholder proposals requesting additional lobbying disclosure. Overall, I show that lobbying institutional investors actively engage in firms' external governance related to law and politics. The second essay takes a unique insight into the ethics of corporate lobbying. We study the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, a regulatory reform on lobbying and government ethics, aiming to mitigate unethical lobbying activities. We find that the average market reaction to the reform, which aimed to mitigate unethical lobbying practices, by lobbying firms is positive, implying the reform benefited these shareholders on average. We also uncover heterogeneity of lobbying firms' response to the reform. Following the Act, firms with a history of active lobbying reduced their lobbying activity, whereas firms with little prior lobbying activity increased their lobbying efforts. Finally, we find that after the enactment of these reforms, firms that engage in active lobbying, and especially those with a good ethical reputation, are more likely to appoint politically connected directors relative to non-lobbying firms. The third essay focuses on the dark side of corporate lobbying on firms. Specifically, we investigate the impacts of lobbying engagement on corporate innovation. One percent increase in lobbying expenditures reduces the number of patents by 30 bps, the number of citations by 50 bps, and the average patent value by 50 bps. We find that more corporate lobbying activities causally impedes innovation, in contrast to the conventional stewardship perspective that lobbying brings government privileges. We find that the effects of corporate lobbying on innovation are stronger in the subsample where firms have more resources constraints and lower institutional ownership, which are constituent with both "resources constraints" and "lazy managers" hypotheses.


The Behavior of Institutional Investors

The Behavior of Institutional Investors
Author: Alexander Pütz
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2012
Genre: Index mutual funds
ISBN: 9783832531898

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Institutional investors such as mutual funds and hedge funds play an important role in today's financial markets. This thesis consists of three essays which empirically study the behavior of active fund managers. In particular, the first essay investigates whether managers behave rationally or if some of them unconsciously make wrong investment decisions due to behavioral biases. The second essay examines whether some managers intentionally act to solely advance their own interests by strategically valuing the security positions in their portfolio. The third essay analyzes what the managers' education reveals about their investment behavior.


Essays in Corporate Finance

Essays in Corporate Finance
Author: Bruno d Laranjeira
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2011
Genre:
ISBN:

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This thesis presents two essays in Corporate Finance. In the first essay, I use the August 2007 crisis episode to gauge the effect of financial contracting on real firm behavior. I identify heterogeneity in financial contracting at the onset of the crisis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt maturity structure. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator approach, I find that firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 cut their investment-to-capital ratio by 2.5 percentage points more (on a quarterly basis) than otherwise similar firms whose debt was scheduled to mature after 2008. This drop in investment is statistically and economically significant, representing one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. A number of falsification and placebo tests suggest that my inferences are not confounded with other factors. For example, in the absence of a credit contraction, the maturity composition of long-term debt has no effect on investment. Moreover, long-term debt maturity composition had no impact on investment during the crisis for firms for which long-term debt was not a major source of funding. Our analysis highlights the importance of debt maturity for corporate financial policy. More than showing a general association between credit markets and real activity, my analysis shows how the credit channel operates through a specific feature of financial contracting. In the second essay, I analyze how institutional investors choose which Initial Public Offering to invest. Using a sample of IPOs from 1980 to 2004, I show that the reputation of the lead underwriter is the most significant variable in this decision process. Using Carter-Manaster rankings of underwriter reputation, I report that a one point increase in the reputation ranking leads to a 2% increase in institutional investors` holding. Moreover, I test hypotheses about what kind of certification the underwriter is providing. I provide evidence that underwriters certify un-measurable characteristics, in contrast to measurable characteristics, such as those provided in the financial statements of the issuer.