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| Author | : |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 32 |
| Release | : 2009 |
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| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Cass R. Sunstein |
| Publisher | : American Bar Association |
| Total Pages | : 220 |
| Release | : 2002 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 9781590310540 |
This book discusses the current topic of Federal Government regulations increasingly assessed by asking whether the benefits of the regulation justifies the cost of the regulation.
| Author | : D. Bruce Johnsen |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 95 |
| Release | : 2019 |
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U.S. law requires federal regulators to perform cost-benefit analysis of new rules proposed to correct market failure. As Coase convincingly showed decades ago, the inefficiencies of market failure can be usefully attributed to the costs of transacting. This essay proposes a novel and relatively simple complement to traditional cost-benefit analysis where market participants face transaction costs sufficiently low that direct bargaining or competitive market forces will drive them toward efficiency. The Coasean approach requires regulators to identify the relevant parties, the economic good they seek to exchange, and the nature of the transaction cost equilibrium that inhibits them from capturing all possible gains from trade. A rule is justified under this approach only if the regulator can show it is likely to reduce transaction costs. Facing lower transaction costs, the parties will adjust their private arrangements to correct inefficiencies and increase the gains from trade. There is no need for the regulator to quantify and weigh total costs and benefits. This is information the parties--the men and women “on the spot”--are best able to identify on their own.
| Author | : F. A. G. den Butter |
| Publisher | : Edward Elgar Publishing |
| Total Pages | : 297 |
| Release | : 2012 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 1781001316 |
This timely book presents practical applications of modern economic theories to trade, transaction costs and institutions within both business and governmental realms. Frank A.G. den Butter explains the importance and means of keeping transaction costs as low as possible. He illustrates how this transaction management can contribute to making firms and nations more competitive by exploiting gains from the division of labour and international fragmentation of production, and uses relevant case studies to illustrate how value is created by reducing transaction costs. Policy recommendations for strengthening the competitive position of trading nations and reducing implementation costs of government policy are presented, and management methods for creating value in organizing production on a global scale are prescribed. A wide-ranging audience encompassing economists in academia, government and business; managers in industry and government; and students of economics, business and globalization will find this book to be a crucial reference tool.
| Author | : David O'Donnell |
| Publisher | : Academic Conferences Limited |
| Total Pages | : 701 |
| Release | : 2010-06-17 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 1906638624 |
| Author | : P. Coletti |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 175 |
| Release | : 2013-09-27 |
| Genre | : Political Science |
| ISBN | : 1137291028 |
Learning from the successes and failures of others is a necessity in the field of public sector innovation. This book develops guidelines for policymakers, practitioners and policy analysts to understand what drives policy success and to transfer innovations from a source case to a target case with a view to assisting effective policy design.
| Author | : Renée A. Stiles |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 436 |
| Release | : 1997 |
| Genre | : |
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| Author | : Barak D. Richman |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2011 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This paper develops a transaction cost economic model for regulation and applies the model to environmental siting regulations designed to overcome NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) political opposition. Negotiations between developers and resistant local communities to site waste facilities, such as landfills or solid waste incinerators, can be characterized as a contracting problem. A rudimentary application of the Coase theorem suggests that developers should be able to compensate communities adequately for hosting a waste facility, but rarely do such negotiations find success. Transaction costs associated with the requisite negotiations, communication, and implementation of the projects preclude efficient bargaining, and thus NIMBY opposition halts the siting of socially necessary and beneficial facilities. Viewing NIMBY disputes as a contracting problem within the world of positive transaction costs therefore reveals the dynamics that foil negotiations between developers and communities. Such a perspective also identifies the role that the theory of the firm can play in understanding how siting regulations overcome those transaction costs and how regulatory regimes can be optimally designed for siting alternative facilities. This paper employs the theory of the firm, specifically transaction cost economics, to articulate the functional purpose of environmental siting regulations and to chart an agenda for regulatory reform. While transaction cost economics traditionally compares mechanisms such as spot markets, contracts, and direct ownership to facilitate economic transactions, we extend transaction cost theory to political transactions between policymakers and initially resistant, though potentially supportive, constituencies. We believe this approach offers a fruitful perspective on regulatory policy. We use it to develop a taxonomy of alternative regulatory regimes and then to propose an overview of regulatory reform for siting socially desirable waste facilities that are either blocked by NIMBY opposition or are unnecessarily shielded from effective negotiations and community participation.
| Author | : Jerry Brito |
| Publisher | : Mercatus Center at George Mason University |
| Total Pages | : 128 |
| Release | : 2012-08-13 |
| Genre | : Law |
| ISBN | : 0983607737 |
Federal regulations affect nearly every area of our lives and interest in them is increasing. However, many people have no idea how regulations are developed or how they have an impact on our lives. Regulation: A Primer by Susan Dudley and Jerry Brito provides an accessible overview of regulatory theory, analysis, and practice. The Primer examines the constitutional underpinnings of federal regulation and discusses who writes and enforces regulation and how they do it. Published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, it also provides insights into the different varieties of regulation and how to analyze whether a regulatory proposal makes citizens better or worse off. Each chapter discusses key aspects of regulation and provides further readings for those interested in exploring these topics in more detail.
| Author | : David M. Driesen |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2005 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This article critically examines the goal of minimizing transaction costs, including the costs of legal decision-making. This goal permeates the law and economics literature and has profoundly influenced public policy. While most transaction cost scholarship has focused upon private law, this influence has been especially pervasive in public law, where it has contributed to a variety of legal changes aimed at reducing public transaction costs, often through privatization. We argue that transaction costs perform useful functions. They frequently enable those engaging in transactions to obtain information needed to correct for information asymmetries or inadequate information. They facilitate efficient transactions, allow the avoidance of bad transactions, and serve important equitable goals. It follows that lawmakers must take transaction cost functions into account when deciding whether eliminating them is desirable. We discuss how to identify transaction cost functions and how to take these functions into account in choosing legal rules. In so doing, we extend the transaction cost debate, which has focused predominantly on private law, into the public law arena, or, more precisely, into the debate about the role of private markets in achieving public values. While some transaction costs deserve elimination, we conclude that maintaining or even increasing transaction costs sometimes makes sense. We show that viewing all transaction costs as a simple deadweight loss skews legal theory in both the public and private realms. This article uses the teachings of the Supreme Court's procedural due process jurisprudence, institutional economics, and theories focusing on information to inform analysis of transaction costs. It examines transaction costs' role in both the legal theory and policy-making in a wide variety of areas, including nuisance law, environmental law, intellectual property, corporate law, contract and the privatization of social services. Keywords: Law & Economics, Institutional Economics, Environmental, Corporate, Contracts, Copyright.
