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The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games

The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games
Author: Holger Ingmar Meinhardt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Total Pages: 270
Release: 2013-10-23
Genre: Mathematics
ISBN: 364239549X

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This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.


The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game

The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
Author: Michael Maschler
Publisher:
Total Pages: 63
Release: 1965
Genre:
ISBN:

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A study of the kernel of a cooperative game. In this paper the authors derive a procedure for the players which, if abided by, leads to an outcome in the kernel. Moreover, each outcome in the kernel can be reached by this procedure. The procedure consists of a set of three rules and involves the formation of 'intermediate coalitions' which play 'intermediate games, ' after which the members of each intermediate coalition play a 'reduced game' to decide the share of their spoils. The procedure is further analyzed in the case of monotonic games and in the case of simple games, and the results that are obtained reduce considerably the amount of computation which is needed to compute the kernels of such games. In particular, they compute the kernel of the 7-person projective game (for the grand coalition), which is a star consisting of seven straight-line segments connecting the center to the points of the main simple solution. Finally, conditions under which modifications of the characteristic function do not change its kernel are presented. (Author).


The Kernel for Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game

The Kernel for Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game
Author: Kensaku Kikuta
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 1998
Genre:
ISBN:

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It is shown that the prekernel and the pre-nucleolus of a cooperative game coincide with the kernel and the nucleolus for the reasonable set of the game respectively.


The Prekernel of Cooperative Games with Alpha-excess

The Prekernel of Cooperative Games with Alpha-excess
Author: Xia Zhang
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 2021
Genre:
ISBN:

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In this paper, we introduce a new approach to measure the dissatisfaction for coalitions of players in cooperative transferable utility games. This is done by considering affine (and convex) combinations of the classical excess and the proportional excess. Based on this so-called alpha-excess, we define new solution concepts for cooperative games, such as the alpha-prenucleolus and the alpha-prekernel. The classical prenucleolus and prekernel are a special case. We characterize the alpha-prekernel by strong stability and the alpha-balanced surplus property. Also, we show that the payoff vector generated by the alpha-prenucleolus belongs to the alpha-prekernel.