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| Author | : Àlvarez Faura Àlvarez |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 12 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Guillem Francès |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We study Network Max-Congestion Games (NMC games, for short), a class of network games where each player tries to minimize the most congested edge along the path he uses as strategy. We focus our study on the complexity of computing a pure Nash equilibria in this kind of games. We show that, for single-commodity games with non-decreasing delay functions, this problem is in P when either all the paths from the source to the target node are disjoint or all the delay functions are equal. For the general case, we prove that the computation of a PNE belongs to the complexity class PLS through a new technique based on generalized ordinal potential functions and a slightly modified definition of the usual local search neighborhood. We further apply this technique to a different class of games (which we call Pareto-efficient) with restricted cost functions. Finally, we also prove some PLS-hardness results, showing that computing a PNE for Pareto-efficient NMC games is indeed a PLS-complete problem.
| Author | : Konstantinos Daskalakis |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 410 |
| Release | : 2008 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
| Author | : Matthias Feldotto |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2019 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
This thesis investigates approximate pure Nash equilibria in different game-theoretic models. In such an outcome, no player can improve her objective by more than a given factor through a deviation to another strategy. In the first part, we investigate two variants of Congestion Games in which the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed through a potential function argument. However, the computation of such equilibria might be hard. We construct and analyze approximation algorithms that enable the computation of states with low approximation factors in polynomial time. To show their guarantees we use sub games among players, bound the potential function values of arbitrary states and exploit a connection between Shapley and proportional cost shares. Furthermore, we apply and analyze sampling techniques for the computation of approximate Shapley values in different settings. In the second part, we concentrate on the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in games in which no pure Nash equilibria exist in general. In the model of Coevolving Opinion Formation Games, we bound the approximation guarantees for natural states nearly independent of the specific definition of the players' neighborhoods by applying a concept of virtual costs. For the special case of only one influential neighbor, we even show lower approximation factors for a natural strategy. Then, we investigate a two-sided Facility Location Game among facilities and clients on a line with an objective function consisting of distance and load. We show tight bounds on the approximation factor for settings with three facilities and infinitely many clients. For the general scenario with an arbitrary number of facilities, we bound the approximation factor for two promising candidates, namely facilities that are uniformly distributed and which are paired. ; eng
| Author | : Tobias Harks |
| Publisher | : Springer Nature |
| Total Pages | : 346 |
| Release | : 2020-09-08 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 3030579808 |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 13th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2020, held in Augsburg, Germany, in September 2020.* The 21 full papers presented together with 3 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 53 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, congestion games and flows over time, markets and matchings, scheduling and games on graphs, and social choice and cooperative games. * The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
| Author | : Ron Lavi |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 307 |
| Release | : 2014-09-05 |
| Genre | : Computers |
| ISBN | : 3662448033 |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 full papers and 5 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching theory, game dynamics, games of coordination, networks and social choice, markets and auctions, price of anarchy, computational aspects of games, mechanism design and auctions.
| Author | : Marco Lübbecke |
| Publisher | : Springer |
| Total Pages | : 620 |
| Release | : 2016-02-20 |
| Genre | : Business & Economics |
| ISBN | : 3319286978 |
This book contains a selection of refereed papers presented at the "International Conference on Operations Research (OR 2014)", which took place at RWTH Aachen University, Germany, September 2-5, 2014. More than 800 scientists and students from 47 countries attended OR 2014 and presented more than 500 papers in parallel topical streams, as well as special award sessions. The theme of the conference and its proceedings is "Business Analytics and Optimization".
| Author | : Eric van Damme |
| Publisher | : Springer Science & Business Media |
| Total Pages | : 354 |
| Release | : 2012-12-06 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 3642582427 |
I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.
| Author | : Yang Cai (Ph. D.) |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 56 |
| Release | : 2010 |
| Genre | : |
| ISBN | : |
We prove a generalization of von Neumann's minmax theorem to the class of separable multiplayer zero-sum games, introduced in [Bregman and Fokin 1998]. These games are polymatrix-that is, graphical games in which every edge is a two-player game between its endpoints-in which every outcome has zero total sum of players' payoffs. Our generalization of the minmax theorem implies convexity of equilibria, polynomial-time tractability, and convergence of no-regret learning algorithms to Nash equilibria. Given that three player zero-sum games are already PPAD-complete, this class of games, i.e. with pairwise separable utility functions, defines essentially the broadest class of multi-player constants sum games to which we can hope to push tractability results. Our result is obtained by establishing a certain game-class collapse, showing that separable constant-sum games are payoff equivalent to pairwise constant-sum polymatrix games-polymatrix games in which all edges are constant-sum games, and invoking a recent result of [Daskalakis, Papadimitriou 2009] for these games. We also explore generalizations to classes of non- constant-sum multi-player games. A natural candidate is polymatrix games with strictly competitive games on their edges. In the two player setting, such games are minmax solvable and recent work has shown that they are merely affine transformations of zero-sum games [Adler, Daskalakis, Papadimitriou 2009]. Surprisingly we show that a polymatrix game comprising of strictly competitive games on its edges is PPAD-complete to solve, proving a striking difference in the complexity of networks of zero-sum and strictly competitive games. Finally, we look at the role of coordination in networked interactions, studying the complexity of polymatrix games with a mixture of coordination and zero-sum games. We show that finding a pure Nash equilibrium in coordination-only polymatrix games is PLS-complete; hence, computing a mixed Nash equilibrium is in PLS n PPAD, but it remains open whether the problem is in P. If, on the other hand, coordination and zero-sum games are combined, we show that the problem becomes PPAD-complete, establishing that coordination and zero-sum games achieve the full generality of PPAD. This work is done in collaboration with Costis Daskalakis.
| Author | : Guilherme Carmona |
| Publisher | : World Scientific |
| Total Pages | : 153 |
| Release | : 2012-11-29 |
| Genre | : Mathematics |
| ISBN | : 9814405817 |
The book aims at describing the recent developments in the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium. The two topics are central to game theory and economics and have been extensively researched. Recent results on existence and stability of Nash equilibrium are scattered and the relationship between them has not been explained clearly. The book will make these results easily accessible and understandable to researchers in the field.
