Spatial Models of Party Competition
Author | : Donald E. Stokes |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 1993-08-01 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9780829027402 |
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Author | : Donald E. Stokes |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 1993-08-01 |
Genre | : |
ISBN | : 9780829027402 |
Author | : James F. Adams |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 344 |
Release | : 2005-03-21 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9781139444002 |
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.
Author | : Richard Drummond McKelvey |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 458 |
Release | : 1972 |
Genre | : Elections |
ISBN | : |
Author | : James Frolik Adams |
Publisher | : University of Michigan Press |
Total Pages | : 251 |
Release | : 2010-07-23 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 0472027182 |
In countries with multiparty political systems, we assume--if the system is going to work--that parties have relatively stable positions on policy, that these positions diverge, and that voters make choices based on policy preferences. Yet much of the research on voter behavior and party competition does not support these assumptions. In Party Competition, James Adams applies the insights of behavioral research to an examination of the policy strategies that political parties (and candidates) employ in seeking election. He argues that vote-seeking parties are motivated to present policies that appeal to voters, whose bias toward these policies is based in part on reasons that have nothing to do with policy. He demonstrates that this strategic logic has profound implications for party competition and responsible party government. Adams's innovative fusion of research methodologies presents solutions to issues of policy stability and voter partisanship. His theory's supported by an in-depth analysis of empirical applications to party competition in Britain, France, and the United States in the postwar years. Party Competition and Responsible Party Government will appeal to readers interested in the study of political parties, voting behavior and elections, as well as to scholars specializing in French, British, and American politics. James Adams is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara.
Author | : Martin J. Zechman |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 159 |
Release | : 1977 |
Genre | : Party affiliation |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Samuel Merrill |
Publisher | : Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | : 234 |
Release | : 1999-09-13 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 9780521665490 |
Professors Merrill and Grofman develop a unified model that incorporates voter motivations and assesses its empirical predictions--for both voter choice and candidate strategy--in the United States, Norway, and France. The analyses show that a combination of proximity, direction, discounting, and party ID are compatible with the mildly but not extremely divergent policies that are characteristic of many two-party and multiparty electorates. All of these motivations are necessary to understand the linkage between candidate issue positions and voter preferences.
Author | : John E ROEMER |
Publisher | : Harvard University Press |
Total Pages | : 349 |
Release | : 2009-06-30 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0674042859 |
John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional.
Author | : Martin J. Zechman |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 140 |
Release | : 1978 |
Genre | : Mathematics |
ISBN | : |
Author | : Giovanni Sartori |
Publisher | : ECPR Press |
Total Pages | : 541 |
Release | : 2014-01-01 |
Genre | : Political Science |
ISBN | : 191025908X |
In this rich and broad-ranging volume, Giovanni Sartori outlines what is now recognised to be the most comprehensive and authoritative approach to the classification of party systems. He also offers an extensive review of the concept and rationale of the political party, and develops a sharp critique of various spatial models of party competition. This is political science at its best – combining the intelligent use of theory with sophisticated analytic arguments, and grounding all of this on a substantial cross-national empirical base. Parties and Party Systems is one of the classics of postwar political science, and is now established as the foremost work in its field.
Author | : Michael Laver |
Publisher | : Princeton University Press |
Total Pages | : 294 |
Release | : 2012 |
Genre | : Business & Economics |
ISBN | : 0691139040 |
Party competition for votes in free and fair elections involves complex interactions by multiple actors in political landscapes that are continuously evolving, yet classical theoretical approaches to the subject leave many important questions unanswered. Here Michael Laver and Ernest Sergenti offer the first comprehensive treatment of party competition using the computational techniques of agent-based modeling. This exciting new technology enables researchers to model competition between several different political parties for the support of voters with widely varying preferences on many different issues. Laver and Sergenti model party competition as a true dynamic process in which political parties rise and fall, a process where different politicians attack the same political problem in very different ways, and where today's political actors, lacking perfect information about the potential consequences of their choices, must constantly adapt their behavior to yesterday's political outcomes. Party Competition shows how agent-based modeling can be used to accurately reflect how political systems really work. It demonstrates that politicians who are satisfied with relatively modest vote shares often do better at winning votes than rivals who search ceaselessly for higher shares of the vote. It reveals that politicians who pay close attention to their personal preferences when setting party policy often have more success than opponents who focus solely on the preferences of voters, that some politicians have idiosyncratic "valence" advantages that enhance their electability--and much more.