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Relation Between Auditor Quality and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

Relation Between Auditor Quality and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
Author: Kiridaran (Giri) Kanagaretnam
Publisher:
Total Pages: 59
Release: 2017
Genre:
ISBN:

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Using an international sample of firms from 31 countries, we study the relation between auditor quality and corporate tax aggressiveness. Using an indicator variable for tax aggressiveness when the firm's corporate tax avoidance measure is within the top quintile of each country-industry combination, we find strong evidence that auditor quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, even after controlling for other institutional determinants such as home-country tax system characteristics. We also find that the negative relation between auditor quality and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is more pronounced in countries where investor protection is stronger, auditor litigation risk is higher, the audit environment is better, and capital market pressure is higher.


Corporate Tax Aggressiveness, Auditor Provided Tax Services, and Audit Quality

Corporate Tax Aggressiveness, Auditor Provided Tax Services, and Audit Quality
Author: Kellie M. Carr
Publisher:
Total Pages: 145
Release: 2017
Genre: Auditing
ISBN:

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Using tax accrual quality as a proxy for audit quality, I investigate whether companies that significantly decreased APTS surrounding the effective date of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's 2006 Rules on Ethics, Independence, and Tax Services experienced an improvement in audit quality after the change. Given the specific target of the PCAOB 2006 restrictions is companies aggressively avoiding taxes with the assistance of APTS, I also investigate whether companies associated with tax aggressive services are also more likely to experience an improvement in audit quality following the reductions in APTS. Results suggest an increase in audit quality due to a reduction in economic bonding following APTS restrictions. Consistent with the economic bonding theory, companies that significantly reduced APTS experienced a larger improvement in audit quality after the change compared to companies that did not significantly reduce APTS. For tax aggressive companies, those that reduced APTS did experience a significant increase in audit quality after the change compared to tax aggressive companies that did not significantly reduce APTS. Moreover, companies considered important tax clients by their audit firms that significantly reduced APTS did experience a marginally greater increase in audit quality after the change compared to other important tax clients that did not significantly reduce APTS. Overall, my results indicate that the PCOAB 2006 restrictions were effective in decreasing APTS and economic bonding, thereby leading to improved audit quality, especially among companies associated with tax aggressive services. Accordingly, concerns for loss of knowledge spillover seem to be minimal. There are few studies that investigate the effectiveness of the PCAOB 2006 restrictions on audit quality. Therefore, my study fills this void by using a tax specific measure of audit quality, tax accrual quality, to specifically examine the target of the restrictions-- audit clients that are associated with aggressive tax services. My study confirms and expands APTS, economic bonding, audit quality, tax accrual quality, and tax aggressive research, and also provides insight into and support for current policy debates concerning APTS and tax aggressive services.


Corporate Tax Planning

Corporate Tax Planning
Author: Kaushal Kumar Agrawal
Publisher: Atlantic Publishers & Dist
Total Pages: 384
Release: 2007-12
Genre:
ISBN: 9788126909179

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Primarily Written For The Students Of Commerce, The Present Book Is A Complete Study Of Tax Planning, Tax Procedures And Management, Wealth Tax, Value Added Tax And Service Tax. Upto The Fifth Edition The Book Was Entitled Direct Tax Planning And Management. Now It Is Entitled Corporate Tax Planning And Has 46 Chapters Divided Into Eleven Self-Contained Units Basics; Tax Planning Of Salary; Tax Holiday; Profits And Gains From Business Or Profession And Capital Gain; Corporate Tax In India; Financial Decisions; Setting Up Of New Business; Managerial Decisions; Tax Planning Others; Corporate Restructuring; And Non-Residents Taxation. The Book Comprehensively Covers The Latest Syllabus Prescribed By Most Of The Indian Universities. In Addition To The Detailed Explanation Of Each Of Its Topics, The Book Is Rich In Illustrations And Practice Exercises That Facilitate Easy Understanding And Quick Revision Of The Subject.The Book Will Undoubtedly Prove Useful To The Students Of B.Com., Cs (Final), Icwa (Final), M.Com., Mba, Mfc And Cfa. Besides Students, The General Readers Keen To Obtain Basic And In-Depth Knowledge Of Tax Planning Will Find This Book Highly Informative.


The Role of Auditors, Non-Auditors, and Internal Tax Departments in Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

The Role of Auditors, Non-Auditors, and Internal Tax Departments in Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
Author: Kenneth J. Klassen
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2018
Genre:
ISBN:

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Using confidential data from the Internal Revenue Service on who signs a corporation's tax return, we investigate whether the party primarily responsible for the tax compliance function of the firm -- the auditor, an external non-auditor, or the internal tax department -- is related to the corporation's tax aggressiveness. We report three key findings: (1) firms preparing their own tax returns or hiring a non-auditor claim more aggressive tax positions than firms using their auditor as the tax preparer; (2) auditor-provided tax services are related to tax aggressiveness even after considering tax preparer identity, which supports and extends prior research using tax fees as a proxy for tax planning; and (3) Big Four tax preparers in particular are linked to less tax aggressiveness when they are the auditor than when they are not the auditor. Our findings help policymakers and researchers better understand an important feature of tax compliance intermediaries, particularly how the dual role via audits is related to observable corporate tax outcomes.


Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Author: OECD
Publisher: OECD Publishing
Total Pages: 91
Release: 2013-02-12
Genre:
ISBN: 9264192743

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This report presents studies and data available regarding the existence and magnitude of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), and contains an overview of global developments that have an impact on corporate tax matters.


Internal Control Quality as an Explanatory Factor of Tax Avoidance

Internal Control Quality as an Explanatory Factor of Tax Avoidance
Author: Andrew M. Bauer
Publisher:
Total Pages: 158
Release: 2011
Genre:
ISBN:

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Internal control disclosures mandated by section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) are designed to provide information about a firm's financial reporting quality and in doing so may offer information on firm-specific tax planning activities. Internal control weaknesses disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function (Ge and McVay, 2005; Gleason, Pincus and Rego, 2010) and thus raise the question of whether or not these frequent problems affect corporate tax avoidance. In this thesis, I test hypotheses that tax-related disclosures, particularly those that contain company-level internal control weaknesses (ICWs), provide information with respect to long-run tax avoidance. Furthermore, I test hypotheses that the combination of internal control quality and aggressive tax avoidance aid in assessing shareholder returns. To conduct these tests, I collect and construct firm-level SOX disclosure data from 2004 to 2006 across 1,286 publicly-owned corporations. I begin with an empirical analysis of the association between tax avoidance and firm-level ICWs and generally find that the presence of tax ICWs and company-level tax ICWs constrain long-run tax avoidance. For firms with low cash constraints however, company-level tax ICWs appear to lead to an increase in tax avoidance. Nevertheless, subsequent analysis of monthly abnormal returns implies that the stock market reacts negatively to the disclosure of company-level tax ICWs, regardless of whether or not tax aggressiveness is also present. This thesis contributes to the literature by documenting the first evidence that internal control disclosures provide information regarding firm-level tax planning. Although the number of internal control weakness disclosures is decreasing over time, the availability of these SOX disclosures represents a previously unavailable opportunity to examine and further understand internal governance mechanisms within the firm and their influence on tax planning. In addition, this thesis further corroborates prior literature that argues for the importance of the pervasiveness of internal control weaknesses by showing that the pervasive, company-level tax internal control weaknesses are associated with tax avoidance and lower shareholder returns. Finally, my dissertation implies that the presence of tax internal control weaknesses constrains tax avoidance and thus a focus on improving internal controls could help improve the tax planning function. However, my firm-level analysis also implies that effective tax planning is a sustainable process and thus a firm and its stakeholders may require several periods before the full benefits of these improvements are realized.


The Association Between Changes in Auditor Provided Tax Services and Long-Term Corporate Tax Avoidance

The Association Between Changes in Auditor Provided Tax Services and Long-Term Corporate Tax Avoidance
Author: Brian Hogan
Publisher:
Total Pages: 0
Release: 2012
Genre:
ISBN:

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This study examines the long-term impact on taxes paid by firms in the time period following the passage of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Legislators, concerned about auditor independence impairment, eliminated the provision of certain non-audit services by auditing firms and required audit committee pre-approval for tax services. As a result, firms decreasingly engaged their audit firms for tax services, instead possibly turning to other accounting firms or internal tax planning, even though information efficiencies may exist by combining the audit-tax function (i.e. knowledge spillover (Gleason and Mills 2011)). Utilizing a sample of 2,240 unique firms covering 2003-2009, we find an economically and statistically significant long-term negative relationship between firm reductions in auditor-provided tax services (APTS) and taxes paid. Further, a portion of this benefit is lost for some firms when returning to their auditor for tax services after a short break. In summary, firms who engage their audit firms for tax services continue to obtain benefits. Firms that reduce or eliminate their APTS, even if retaining other accounting firms for tax engagements, on average pay more taxes over the long-term.


The Crisis in Tax Administration

The Crisis in Tax Administration
Author: Henry Aaron
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Total Pages: 420
Release: 2004-05-20
Genre: Political Science
ISBN: 9780815796565

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People pay taxes for two reasons. On the positive side, most people recognize, even if grudgingly, that payment of tax is a duty of citizenship. On the negative side, they know that the law requires payment, that evasion is a crime, and that willful failure to pay taxes is punishable by fines or imprisonment. The practical questions for tax administration are how to strengthen each of these motives to comply with the law. How much should be spent on enforcement and how should enforcement be organized to promote these objectives and achieve the best results per dollar spent? Over the last few years, the U.S. Congress has restricted spending on tax administration, forcing the Internal Revenue Service to curtail enforcement activities, at the same time, that the number of individual filers has increased, tax rules have become more complex, and more business have become multinational operations. But if too many cases of tax evasion go undetected and unpunished, those who may have grudgingly paid their taxes may soon find it easier to join the scofflaws. These events in combination have created a genuine crisis in tax administration. The chapters in this volume evaluate the capacity of authorities to enforce the tax laws in a modern, global economy and examine the implications of failing to do so. Specific aspects of tax law, including tax shelters, issues relating to small businesses, tax software, role of tax preparers, and the objectives of tax simplification are examined in detail. The volume also builds a conceptual basis for future scholarship, with regard not only to tax administration, but also to such fundamental questions as whether taxpayers respond mostly to economic incentives or are influenced by their experiences with the filing process and what is the proper framework for evaluating the allocation of resources within the IRS.


Tax Aggressiveness and Auditor Resignation

Tax Aggressiveness and Auditor Resignation
Author: Beng Wee Goh
Publisher:
Total Pages: 65
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

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We examine the relation between client tax aggressiveness and auditor's resignation decision. Consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance which suggests that client tax aggressiveness can increase litigation and reputational risk to auditors and increase the potential conflict with managers, we find a positive association between our proxies for tax aggressiveness and the likelihood that an auditor resigns from an audit engagement. Further, this association is stronger when external monitoring of the client firm is less effective, when there is greater potential for agency problems in the client firm, and when the economic importance of the fees received from the client firm is lower. Overall, our study identifies client tax risk as an important determinant of auditors' resignation. This result should be of interest to auditors who actively manage client audit risks and to tax authorities who have incentives to identify firms with abusive tax reporting behavior.