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Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases

Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases
Author: David Ikenberry
Publisher:
Total Pages: 48
Release: 1994
Genre: Corporations
ISBN:

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We examine long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements which occurred during the period 1980 to 1990. We find that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the initial announcement is 12.1 percent. For `value' stocks, companies more likely to be repurchasing shares because of undervaluation, the average abnormal return is 45.3 percent. For repurchases announced by `glamour' stocks where undervaluation is less likely to be an important motive, no positive drift in abnormal returns is observed. Thus, at least with respect to value stocks, the market errs in its initial response and appears to ignore much of the information conveyed through repurchase announcements.


Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases

Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases
Author: David L. Ikenberry
Publisher:
Total Pages: 33
Release: 2010
Genre:
ISBN:

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We examine long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements which occurred during the period 1980 to 1990. We find that the average abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return measured after the initial announcement is 12.1 percent. For `value' stocks, companies more likely to be repurchasing shares because of undervaluation, the average abnormal return is 45.3 percent. For repurchases announced by `glamour' stocks where undervaluation is less likely to be an important motive, no positive drift in abnormal returns is observed. Thus, at least with respect to value stocks, the market errs in its initial response and appears to ignore much of the information conveyed through repurchase announcements.


False Signals from Stock Repurchase Announcements

False Signals from Stock Repurchase Announcements
Author: De-Wai Chou
Publisher:
Total Pages: 38
Release: 2004
Genre:
ISBN:

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This paper investigates the possibility of false signaling by firms announcing open-market stock repurchases. We examine a sample of 281 open-market share repurchases, with the self-styled reason of undervaluation, by firms between 1993 and 1998. Our results showed no evidence of an upward revision in the earnings forecasts of analysts following open-market share repurchase announcements, finding instead, small negative surprise revisions, which contradicts the prevailing empirical evidence. Moreover, we found that surrounding share repurchase announcements, managers manipulated discretionary accruals upward. We posit that this action, on the part of management, is to persuade market participants that the equity of their firm is undervalued. We also found no evidence of the market underreaction phenomenon but did observe negative abnormal returns in the 3- to 12-month period subsequent to the announcement. Overall, our results confirm that with a weaker signaling power, open-market share repurchase programs have been used to send a false signal to the marketplace, by emphasizing an undervalued equity.


Share Repurchases

Share Repurchases
Author: Theo Vermaelen
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 117
Release: 2005
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN: 1933019166

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This survey derives some of the key results on the taxation of international investment in variants of one model of multinational investment.


Corporate Payout Policy

Corporate Payout Policy
Author: Harry DeAngelo
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
Total Pages: 215
Release: 2009
Genre: Corporations
ISBN: 1601982046

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Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.


The Credibility of Open Market Share Repurchase Signaling

The Credibility of Open Market Share Repurchase Signaling
Author: Ilona Babenko
Publisher:
Total Pages: 63
Release: 2013
Genre:
ISBN:

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Open market share repurchase announcements are commonly associated with equity undervaluation, but their signal about firm value can often be misleading. We conjecture that executives who buy shares of their firm before an announcement add credibility to the undervaluation signal. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that announcement returns are positively related to past insider purchases, especially for firms that are priced less efficiently. Firms whose insiders bought more shares are also more likely to complete their repurchase plans. Finally, we find that insider purchases predict post-announcement stock returns.


The Debt/equity Choice

The Debt/equity Choice
Author: Ronald W. Masulis
Publisher:
Total Pages: 168
Release: 1988
Genre: Business & Economics
ISBN:

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Payout Policy

Payout Policy
Author:
Publisher:
Total Pages: 83
Release: 2007
Genre: Corporations
ISBN: 9781846632563

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Dividend policy continues to be among the premier unsolved puzzles in finance. A number of theories have been advanced to explain dividend policy. This e-book briefly reviews the principal theories of payout policy and dividend policy and summarizes the empirical evidence on these theories. Empirical evidence is equivocal and the search for new explanation for dividends continues.


Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases

Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases
Author: Jesse M. Fried
Publisher:
Total Pages: 63
Release: 2014
Genre:
ISBN:

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Public companies in the United States and elsewhere increasingly use open market stock buybacks, rather than dividends, to distribute cash to shareholders. Academic commentators have emphasized the possible benefits of such repurchases for shareholders. However, little attention has been paid to their potential drawbacks. This Article shows that managers use open market repurchases to indirectly buy stock for themselves at a bargain price. Managers also boost stock prices by announcing repurchase programs they do not intend to execute, enabling them to unload their own shares at a higher price. Such bargain repurchases and inflated-price sales systematically transfer significant amounts of value from public investors to managers, as well as distort managers' payout decisions. The Article concludes by proposing a new approach to regulating open market repurchases: requiring firms to disclose specific details of their buy orders in advance. This pre-repurchase disclosure rule, the Article shows, would undermine managers' ability to use repurchases for informed trading and false signaling, thereby reducing the resulting distortions and costs to shareholders. Moreoever, it would achieve these objectives without eroding any of the potential benefits of repurchases.


An Analysis of Repurchase Behavior in Open Market Stock Buyback Programs

An Analysis of Repurchase Behavior in Open Market Stock Buyback Programs
Author: Tony Altobelli
Publisher:
Total Pages:
Release: 1998
Genre:
ISBN:

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Boards of directors authorize billions of dollars in open market (OM) stock buybacks each year, but little is known about how many shares are actually repurchased. This paper analyses the repurchase behavior of firms that announce OM buyback programs. We find that OM announcements are credible signals. On average, firms repurchase more shares than originally authorized over the four quarters following the announcement, though there is considerable variation across firms. We examine the factors influencing repurchase behavior, and find that repurchases in a given quarter are associated with a number of variables, including past and current returns, profitability, and prior repurchase activity. We also investigate how shares outstanding change following OM program announcements. Firms in our sample actively issue shares over the test period so that the average decrease in shares outstanding is only about 20% of the number repurchased. For the most part, changes in shares are influenced by the same factors affecting repurchases and in the predicted direction.